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THE CHALLENGE OF THE "NEw DEAL"
Following the decision of Frothinghain v. Meiloi 40 one commentator
noted 7 that the ruling in that case has "made it difficult, if not impos-
sible, for the courts to exercise any check" upon Congressional appro-
priations. It is probable that "if not" was intended to convey the
meaning of "even though not" rather than the much stronger "or even";
but others, even very recently, have not been this careful in qualify-
ing their statement that "the spending power of Congress is beyond the
range of judicial attack"' 4s The scope of this power, it seemed, had
become a "political" question. But such a conclusion was based upon
the assumption that the government would be careful to confine its
operations within the bulwark of the Frothingliant rule, drawing upon
the general fund for all doubtful appropriations'40 and so conducting it-
self as to prevent other grounds for action arising. Instead, the pres-
ent administration, with a candor which is to be commended, chose to
abandon this immunity from suit in return for the greater degree of
flexibility in its program thereby secured.
The crop reduction program of the A. A. A. could well have been
financed exclusively from the general fund. Many originally felt, en-
tirely apart from the question of judicial checks, that it would be wise
to do this. Such a choice would have prevented the pyramiding of
taxes and by the same token lessened the danger of price rises so great
as seriously to reduce the demand for the products. But the govern-
ment chose to raise the greater part of the money necessary for rental
and benefit payments through special excise taxes, to be collected solely
upon the processing of those products concerning which such payments
were to be made, and definitely earmarked for such use.'"0 By doing
so it created a set of facts entirely apart from those of Frothingam v.
Mellon. The processors' interest in these expenditures could not be
characterized as "indefinite," nor was it shared "in common with people
generally." Their bearing upon this tax bill, far from being "remote,
*For the frst installment of this article, see (1936) 45 YA L. J. 751.
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146. 262 U. S. 447 (1923).
147. Note (1924) 37 HARv. L. Rnv. 750, 753.
148. Seaks, Power of the Federal Government to Condemn for Housing (1934) 1 LAw
AND CoNTrEa . PROB. 232, 233.
149. This view assumes that the mere size of an appropriation would not render the
Frothinghanz rule inapplicable. But see infra.
150. 48 STAT. 35 (1933), 7 U. S. C. A. §§ 609 (a), 612 (b) (1935).
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fluctuating and uncertain," was direct and determinate. Although the
issue was never litigated, and has now become moot in the case of the
A. A. A., it is entirely probable that one who is so situated will be held
to be a proper party to contest the validity of an appropriation in an
action to enjoin the spending of the money or the contracting of debt.",'
Entirely apart from such a possibility, judicial review of the A. A. A.
program was inevitable.
"It is elementary that the same statute may be in part constitutional
and in part unconstitutional, and if the parts are wholly independent of
each other, that which is constitutional may stand while that which is
unconstitutional will be rejected. . . . If the different parts 'are so
mutually connected with and dependent on each other, as conditions,
considerations or compensations for each other, as to warrant the belief
that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that, if all could not
be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue in-
dependently, and some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which
are thus dependent, conditional or connected, must fall with them."M 5 2
One who is adversely affected by a proJision which, if passed in-
dependently, would be valid, may rely upon the invalidity of these con-
nected portions of the act.'1 3 Obviously nothing could be clearer than
that the processing taxes were not independent of, but directly dependent
upon, the provisions for rental and benefit payments. Hence the validity
of these payments was certain to be attacked the momenat that the gov-
ernment's right to collect or retain such taxes was called into question,
whatever the form of the action might be.
Wherever the proceeds of a tax are earmarked for an unconstitutional
use and the tax is levied solely in contemplation of such use,1 4 an addi-
tional argument against the validity of the tax can be made on the doc-
trine that there can be no lawful tax which is not levied for a lawful
151. Although no such injunction was sought in the Hoosac Mills case, the majority
opinion, in reply to certain contentions on behalf of the government, stated that Froth-
ingham v. Mellon "might be an authority" against the granting of such relief. 56 Sup Ct.
315 (1936). The form of the statement necessarily implies that on the other hand It may
not be in point. Cf. Williams v. Riley, 280 U. S. 78 (1929). If Congress continues making
it difficult for a taxpayer to enjoin the collection of an allegedly illegal tax, and restrict-
ing his right to recover such taxes when paid under protest, we may expect an early effort
to establish this remedy.
152. Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 158 U. S. 601, 636 (1895), quoting Shaw,
C. J., in Warren v. Charlestown, 2 Gray 84 (Mass. 1854).
153. Ibid.
154. Cf. § 32 of the 1935 amendments to the AcRiCULTURAL ADJUSTMENT Act, 49 STAT.
774, 7 U. S. C. A.,§ 612 (c), (1935), appropriating "an amount equal to 307 of the
gross receipts from duties collected under the customs laws" for certain purposes under the
act. There was no corresponding increase in the tariff rates. Obviously the invalidity
of thQse purposes, or even of the entire act, would only invalidate this appropriation, and
would not affect the tariff. See the discussion of the new taxes levied in connection with
the RALROAD RmmasN Acr of 1935 at p. 49, infra.
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purpose. In essence this is merely the same argument in new dress, the
facts to be proved under either being identical. But it is further evi-
dence that the Court's ruling in United States v. Butler? ' that the pro-
cessing taxes are not true taxes was purely gratuitous, and that the re-
verse conclusion would have had no effect upon the necessity of pass-
ing upon the validity of the spending clauses of the Agricultural Ad-
justment Act.
Although definite earmarking furnishes this additional form of the
argument, it is by no means necessary. The Social Security Act1 u0 levies
income taxes upon the wages of employees and excise taxes upon em-
ployers measured by the size of their payrolls, all proceeds to be paid
into the general fund for undesignated uses. The nationally financed
and administered scheme of retirement pensions,15T like all other portions
of the act, aie financed exclusively from the general fund. Yet these
taxes were obviously adopted in contemplation of this pension system,
being intended to reimburse the general fund for the drain which will
be made upon it by these pensions. The government's own literature
concedes as much when it links the two in summaries of the security
plan; and of course the fact that the definitions of "wages" and "em-
ployment" are identical in the sections providing for pensions and in
those levying the taxes is further evidence. It would seem idle to
argue that the latter would have been adopted without the former, or
that the Court should sustain either tax if it finds the pension plan un-
constitutional. As the law requires the employer to deduct the amount
of the employee's tax from his wages, an additional means of contest-
ting the validity of this tax, and hence of the pension system, is to be
had through an action by an employee against his employer for wages
due. This is one appropriation the validity of which can be contested
the moment an interested group decides that it is wise to do so. 5
At first blush the second group of excise taxes upon employers,'
likewise measured by payrolls, might seem to open the way to an at-
tack upon the plan for federally aided state unemployment insurance
systems. As a credit up to 90% of the federal tax is allowed to em-
ployers contributing to a state unemployment insurance fund, the con-
nection between the taxing and substantive provisions is, if anything,
even more clear than in the case of the pension system. But there is
less reason to conclude that the tax would not have been levied without
155. 56 Sup. Ct. 312 (1936), discussed in first installment of this article in (1936) 45
YA L. J. 751.
156. 49 STAT. 636, 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 1001-1011 (1935).
157. Id. at §§ 401-410.
158. A test case is now pending in a supreme court of the District of Columbia. 3 U.
S. LAw WEEH 614 (1936).
159. 49 STAT. 636, 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 1101-1110 (1935).
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the accompanying federal subsidy. It is complete in itself, being ob-
viously intended to counter-'balance the advantage which might other-
wise accrue to the employer in a state which refrains from adopting
an unemployment insurance system. This intention is of no import-
ance to us here, however significant it may appear to a court asked to
hold the tax unconstitutional because of its essentially non-revenue pur-
pose.- ° This is clearly one case in which Congress, by failing to ear-
mark the proceeds for use in connection with the act, has rendered an
attack upon the appropriation clauses difficult.
The P. W. A., set up under Title II of the N. I. R. A., 1 ' far over-
shadows any other spending agency in the history of America. But as
it has been financed exclusively from the general funds the avenue of
attack outlined above has not been open. Counsel have therefore seized
upon the ingenious device of attempting to enjoin municipal corpora-
tions from accepting its loans and gifts. 1 2 In the first such suit, brought
to prevent construction of a municipal electric system, the private power
company sued. solely in its capacity as a municipal taxpayer, and lost
when it failed to establish any basis for fearing an increased tax bur-
den1e In subsequent cases the petitioning company has been careful
to note that it is suing to prevent the city from entering into illegal
competition with it, the source of such illegality consisting in the ac-
ceptance of tainted federal funds. 4 As there would seem to be merit
in the government's contention that the action of the city is legal, re-
gardless of the validity of the federal law,10 it is entirely possible that
the primary purpose of these cases lies in their nuisance value and that
they offer little opportunity for contesting the scope of the spending
power. 6 ' Yet it is scarcely conceivable that the validity of the P. W. A.
160. See the discussion of this statute in (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 751.
161. 48 STAT. 200 (1933), 40 U. S. C. A. § 401 et seq. (1935).
162. Of the 31 municipal power projects financed by the Pf W. A. down to July, 1935,
such injunctions were sought in all but 9 instances. Prentice-Hall, Fed. Trade & Industry
Service (2d ed. 1935) § 40,024.
163. Consumer's Power Co. v. City of Allegan, 71 F. (2d) 477 (C. C. A. 6th, 1934).
Cert. denied October 8, 1934.
164. For typical cases see Arkansas-Mo. Power Co. v. City of Kennett, 78 F. (2d) 911
(C. C. A. 8th, 1935); Missou'ri Utilities Co. v. City of California, 8 F. Supp. 454 (W. D.
Mo. 1934).
165. Cf. the rule followed in the administration of the criminal law, where the illegality
of a search and seizure by the officers of one government does not taint the evidence when
offered in proof of a rime under the laws of the other. Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S.
383 (1914). This and allied doctrines have been carried to such extremes in criminal
cases that it would seeiA strange indeed to hold that the invalidity of a federal appro-
priation taints the legality of a subsidized municipal project. See Grant, Immunity from
Compulsory Self-Incrimination in a Federal System of Government (1934-1935) 9 Tnsrxm
L. Q. 57, 194. Other references will be found in my Penal Ordinances in California (1936)
24 CALrs. L. Rtv. 123.
166. Liberty League lawyers seem to have conceded as much in refusing to appeal tho
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program can remain immune from judicial scrutiny. Ultimately its con-
tracts with cities regarding the rates to be charged for electrical current
furnished from their federally subsidized plants will come before the
courts, possibly through an effort on the part of a city to charge higher
rates, or in a clash between the contract provisions and the rate regula-
tions of a state. The T. V. A. power program may be contested in a simi-
lar way-167
Although United States v. Certain Lands in Louisville,0 8 having be-
come moot, has been dismissed at the request of the government, this
case is conclusive proof of the superficiality of the conclusion that "the
spending power of Congress is beyond the range of judicial attack."
P. W. A.,'69 like T. V. A.,' 70 is authorized to "acquire . . . by exercise
of the power of eminent domain, any real or personal property" neces-
sary to carry out the provisions of the act. Unless desirable projects
are to be abandoned, or the administration is to consent to a fleecing
at the hands of individuals holding key properties, resort to such pro-
ceedings is, in the long run, inevitable. In the Louisville case the gov-
ernment sought to acquire certain lands to complete a low-cost housing
and slum-clearance project, but as this specific enterprise was defended
as a link in a national program of public works to relieve unemployment
it would have brought up the entire program of the P. W. A. and W. P. A.
for review. And the recent decision in Ashwander v. T. V. A."
demonstrated that when the government attempts to purchase proper-
ties from a corporation, rather than from an individual, resort to com-
pulsion through eminent domain proceedings may be unnecessary to en-
able disgruntled stockholders to contest the validity of this purchase
through an attack upon the legality of the project with which it is
connected.
It is quite impossible to foresee all of the ways in which the spending
programs of the present administration may come before the courts, but
certainly there are many others. The power program of the T. V. A.'7 -
is especially vulnerable in that it purports to disregard the regulatory
provisions of the states concerned. Does not this open the door to an
action by a power company seeking to enjoin illegal competition? Or
to a state, seeking to exclude the T. V. A. from the market? Might not
case of Ashwander v. City of Florence, reported together with T. V. A. v. Ashwander in
78 F. (2d) 573 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935).
167. The act requires that the wholesale purchasers of the Corpocation's power must
resell at rates fixed by the Authority's directors. 48 STAT. 65 (1933), 16 U. S. C. A. § 831
(k) (1935). The validity of this clause, even as concerns power developed at the Wilson
Dam, was not passed upon in Ashwander v. T. V. A., 56 Sup. Ct. 466 (1936).
163. 78 F. (2d) 684 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935). Cert. granted October 28, 1935; dismissed
March 5, 1936.
169. 48 STAT. 202 (1933), 40 U. S. C. A. § 403 (1935).
170. 43 STAT. 67 (1933), 16 U. S. C. A. § 831 (q) (1935).
171. 56 Sup. Ct. 466 (1936). See comment (1936) 45 Y= L. J. 649.
172. See Note (1934) YAm L. J. 815. And see infra.
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the Comptroller General refuse to accept warrants drawn under an ap-
propriation act which he considers to be unconstitutional,' 3 thus pre-
cipitating an action involving even those phases of the spending power
which may be, under the present state of the authorities, completely
immune from attack at the hands of private persons?
At the same time that it was becoming increasingly evident that the
Court would be forced to face the issue of the scope of the national
spending power on its merits, the impression was growing that it would
be driven to prescribing limits to this power. This was particularly
true if it proposed to continue, as in Hammer v. Dagenhart174 to treat
certain time honored powers of the states as in themselves limitations
upon the powers of the federal government. The activities of the A. A. A.
threatened national regulation of production on a scale beside which
the condemned child labor acts paled into insignificance. The T. V. A.,
if permitted to follow the program thus far worked out, may gain the
electric market of the valley, in which case "the state governments of
that part of the country will be driven from the recognized field of
power regulation.1 175  P. W. A. may repeat this feat in the case of the
Grand Coulee project and others.
If further action was necessary to bring this issue to a head, it was
furnished by the aftermath of Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Rail-
way Company, 76 holding that the commerce power cannot serve as the
basis of legislation forcing a compulsory system of retirement pensions
upon interstate carriers. There are reasons for suspecting"1 7 that the
real basis of the majority's opinion was a belief that any such act would
violate the niceties of due process of law, and hence could not be justi-
fied under any power possessed by either government, the explanation
that as a regulation of commerce it exceeds the powers of Congress be-
ing seized upon merely because it might meet with a greater degree of
popular approval. But Congress, instead of directly challenging this
173. "By . . . establishing the General Accounting Office, Congress has constituted the
Comptroller General as the authority to determine the legality of expenditurces of national
monies." H. T. Hunt, General Counsel of P. W. A., P. W. A. Release No. 1507, July 20,
1935, quoted in Prentice-Hall, op. cit. supra note 162. If the Comptroller General comes
under the rule of Rathbun v. United States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935), which would seem
reasonable, and is removable only by joint resolution of Congress-a procedure entail-
ing a good deal of publicity-he may be in a position of sufficient security to exercise an
independent judgment on such questions. His failure to take any action thus far may be
attributed to the conviction of his counsel, doubtless shaken by the Iloosac M ills decision,
that the national spending power is virtually unlimited. See McGuire, The New Deal and
the Public Money (1935) 23 GEORGETOWN L. J. 155.
174. 247 U. S. 251 (1918).
175. Note (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 815, 826.
176. 295 U. S. 330 (1935).
177. See the excellent discussion of this case in Powell, Commerce, Pensions, and Codes
(1935) 49 HaRV. L. Rav. 1, 193.
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portion of the opinion through the passage of an amended act under
the commerce power, provided for the payment of pensions directly from
the federal treasury, the money to be taken from the general fund1 7
Sponsors of the new act78 openly confessed to the intention of thus
placing it within the rule of Frothinglham v. Mellon and beyond the reach
of judicial review.
Had Congress gone no further its threat would have been but partial,
amounting to nothing more than a gift to the railroad industry which
would operate to relieve it, at least in part, from the burdens of its
voluntary pension systems. But a second act 5 0 passed at the same
time levied special income taxes upon railroad employees and excise
taxes, measured by payrolls, upon the carriers. These taxes are to be
"paid into the Treasury of the United States as internal-revenue re-
ceipts." They are obviously levied to replenish the treasury for the
drain of these pensions, but their passage in a separate act which is
complete in itself is a clear indication that Congress intends that neither
act shall fall because the other is held unconstitutional. The insepar-
ability doctrine of Pollock v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co11 is there-
fore not applicable; and as the taxes are not earmarked the Court must
find a "constructive" dedication in order to invalidate them as being
levied for an unconstitutional purpose. Even then it would be faced
with the task of so limiting the scope of the spending power as to in-
validate the appropriating of money for pensions.
Of course, it is possible that by the very act of cutting these taxes
apart from the pensions Congress has undermined their validity. This
is particularly true of those on employees, which would seem to violate
the newly-found "equal protection" requirements of the "due process"
clause of the Fifth Amendment.'82 More is to be said for the validity
of those on carriers, as there are ample grounds for taxing railroads
on a different basis than other business enterprises; and if these parti-
cular taxes are struck downlss they may readily be replaced by other
and valid ones. Unless the Court finds some way to invalidate the pen-
sion appropriations, therefore, the result may be that the Court's de-
cision under the commerce power will have accomplished nothing except
to relieve the employee of his share and shift the entire burden of the
pension system to the carrier. If this challenge is successful, Congress
178. 49 STAT. 967, 45 U. S. C. A. § 215 et seq. (1935).
179. See 25 AaNaB. LABOR LEG. REv. 137 (1935).
180. 49 STAT. 974, 45 U. S. C. A. § 241 et seq. (1935).
181. 158 U. S. 601 (1895).
182. See Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312 (1932).
183. It would seem particularly difficult to justify exempting all compensation paid
in excess of $300 per month. Of course when the tax is considered in connection with the
pension plan the reason is evident, that portion of the salary in exces of this figure not
entering into the computation of the pension.
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may invade other fields; for there is no reason why such a pension sys-
tem need be restricted to those branches of industry which are directly
engaged in interstate trade, while the wider the tax base the less vul-
nerable it would be to attack. Indeed, in the Social Security Act184
Congress has already undertaken a general system of industrial pen-
sions. All that would be necessary to make it into a real retirement act
would be to boost the figures. In attempting to stem the tide, the Court
invited a deluge.
Here, then, was a direct challenge, comparable to the Child Labor
Tax Act of 1919. Would it, like that statute, prove a turning point
in the law? Would the Court, in short, after nearly a century and a
half of silence, limit the spending power? It has apparently chosen to
do so, and in the Hoosac Mills case we have the first intimation of the
new law which is to govern this important field. But before turning
to a detailed analysis of that opinion let us briefly examine the alter-
natives which presented themselves for choice and which restricted the
actual degree of freedom which could be exercised in that decision.
THE MADISON THEORY
The narrowest possible view is that advanced by James Madison in
number 41 of The Federalist: The spending power of Congress is as
broad as, but no broader than, its powers to govern. Under this inter-
pretation, Congress can appropriate money for the "general welfare"
only in so far as spending may be incidental to an exercise of its other
delegated powers. In short, it denies that the clause is intended to con-
fer an additional substantive power, and treats it solely as an express
indication that in establishing post offices and post roads, providing
and maintaining a navy, or calling forth the militia "to execute the laws
of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions," it may back
up its laws with the purse.
When this is reduced to its elements, the doctrine would seem open
to the criticism that it reduces the phrase to "mere tautology,"'18 since
any grant of substantive power would obviously seem to carry with it
a right to spend the necessary money to carry it into effect. But the
Madison rule is based upon the assumption that this clause is essentially
a taxing rather than a spending one, intended to permit the national gov-
ernment to raise its own funds without relying upon state action.
Viewed in this light the clause, even though narrowly construed, takes
on new importance, for no such power was vested in the central govern-
ment under the Articles of Confederation. The argument then pro-
ceeds: the phrase "common defense and general welfare" was borrowed
from the Articles of Confederation,186 where it was never considered
184. 49 STAT. 636, 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 1001-1011 (1935).
185. United States v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 319 (1936).
186. Art 8, where or was used rather than and.
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to confer power to spend for non-federal'8 7 purposes, and should re-
ceive a similar construction in the new document; 8 no broader claims
were made for it prior to ratification;1 9 according to settled rules of
constitutional and statutory construction, a general clause is qualified
by the specific enumeration of powers which follows;' a broader con-
struction, in keeping with the normal import of the words "general
welfare," would be inconsistent with the limited type of central gov-
ernment which the Constitution purported to establish. 0
This view is not to be too lightly brushed aside. From the time of
the Constitutional Convention until today it has had the support of
eminent constitutional lawyers and statesmen.0 2  Even such a thor-
ough-going Hamiltonian as Professor Corwin concedes, "That a majority
of the Court has been inclined generally to xegard Madison's inter-
pretation as the theoretically correct one, seems not improbable.' 0 3
It certainly has the advantages of simplicity and definiteness, and avoids
the seemingly incongruous situation which invites Congress to accom-
plish results through the purse which it is powerless to command, thus,
in the name of the Constitution, requiring the expensive rather than
the practical. And of course it would furnish an easy solution to such
a challenge as that presented by the Railroad Retirement Act. For
the conclusion that the establishment of a pension system does, or does
not, exceed the power of Congress to regulate commerce would auto-
matically settle its status under the spending power.
187. Throughout this paper the term "non-federal" is used to designate expenditure.
which cannot be justified on any of the powers of Congress save the spending power. If
it is incidental to one of the normal powers of Congress, it is for a federal purpose. Con-
sequently neither, to other than a Madisonian, carries any stigma of unconstitutionality.
188. 9 Warr=Gs oF JA=s MADIsoy (Hunt ed. 1910) 411, 418; 6 id. 341, 3M4.
189. See Post, The Constitutionality of Government Spending for the General WDelfare
(1935) 22 VA. L. R-v. 1, 3-4, where much is made of this argument.
190. 6 WaRflos oF JA ms MArnsox (Hunt ed. 1910) 341, 355.
191. 15 WRrr=s OF Tnomirs JEF ERsoN (Library ed. 1910) 133.
192. The authorities are collected in Post, cited supra note 189. See also: WAnu z,
CONG Ss AS SANTA CLAus (1932) 6-9; BEck, OUR WoNarAl o or BununczY (1932)
24, and recent statements of Liberty League lawyers. Mr. Beck laments, "In no objective
did the Constitutional Convention more singularly fail than in this. In attempting to
limit the power of expenditure the Constitution made possible an interpretation which
has given to the power of expenditure an unlimited scope." Loc. dt. It is interesting to
contrast MTr. Beck out with Mr. Beck in, for as Solicitor General he was a leading con-
tributor to this "singular failure." In 1923 he argued, "The grant of power to tax and
appropriate in the first clause of section 8, is distinct from the grants of power in each
of the other sixteen clauses of that section, and there is nothing in the sweeping term 'to
provide for . . . the general welfare' to show that the power to appropriate money was
given merely in aid of the grants in those other clauses." Massachusetts v. Uellon, 262
U. S. 447, 456 (1923). Doubtless as a Liberty League attorney he has often lamented
his success in that case in rendering it so difficult to contest the validity of an appro-
priation.
193. TwiGHT OF TnE SupREM CoURT (1934) 174.
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Judicial review suffers from the fact that it is purely negative, and
often comes into play so late that history, rather than law, is the de-
cisive factor. Had the judges faced this issue in the early days of the
Union, they might well have adopted the Madison construction. But
a century and a half of "general welfare" spending was more than any
court could undo. What would become of the Public Health Service?
The Bureau of Education? The Geological and Geodetic Surveys?
The Fisheries Bureau? The Bureau of Mines? Possibly many (but
certainly far from all) of the functions of the Department of Coln-
merce can be tied to the commerce power, but can the same be said of
the Department of Labor, 9 ' with its Women's and Children's bureaus,
the Department of Agriculture, or even the R. F. C.? Few of the acti-
vities of the Census Bureau have to do with an "enumeration" to serve
as the basis for congressional reapportionment. 9" And the A. A. A.
aside, would the farmer'96 surrender his agricultural statistics, his seed
loans, his federally subsidized county agent or agricultural experiment
station, or even his "farmer's bulletins" on how to remove ink spots from
clothing or exterminate termites? Long before 1936, the Madison
construction had forfeited its right to a hearing. To this extent the
forces of history had molded the law.
THE HAMILTON THEORY
There is no logical stopping point between the view of Madison and
that of Hamilton, perhaps best stated by the converted Democrat,
Monroe:
"My idea is that Congress have an unlimited power to raise money,
and that in its appropriation they have a discretionary power, restricted
only by the duty to appropriate it to purposes of common defense, and of
general, not local, national, not state, benefit."'9 7
This construction is based upon a literal interpretation of the words
used, and erects the spending power into a distinct, substantive power
rather than a mere means of carrying out the other delegated powers.
Such an interpretation leaves plenty of room for a judicial check upon
194. The Court has stated that the "normal function" of this Department is not the
regulation of interstate commerce, but "the advancement and protection of the welfare of
the workers." Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U. S. 20, 37 (1922).
195. As to the difficulties encountered in attempting to justify its numerous activities
on the basis of other express powers aside from the spending power, see F. T. C. v. Claire
Furniture Co., 274 U. S. 160 (1927).
196. An excellent summary of the growth of federal expenditures in aid of agriculture
is given in a 1920 brief by Chas. E. Hughes, reprinted in 72 CONG. REc. 7890 (1930).
Such aid had been recommended by President Washington. 1 Ric A soN, MESSAOES mD
PAPERs OP = PRESIDENTS (1897) 202.
197. 2 id. at 173.
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Congressional spending. Is the money appropriated for a "public pur-
pose"? Is it for the "general welfare"? When appropriating for non-
federal 98 purposes, can the government merely subsidize others, or can
it build, supervise, and operate? If the latter is permissible, does it
enter upon such activities as a superior government, with the power of
eminent domain and the right to proceed in violation of the laws of the
states? How far can it go in building a regulatory system upon a spend-
ing base? These questions must be considered in turn. In large part
they still remain unanswered.
Public Purpose. In a series of cases, of which Loan Association v.
Topeka 99 is perhaps the most typical, the Supreme Court showed an
intention to make the test of "public purpose" an effective check upon
the fiscal power, even resting its rulings, in the absence of express con-
stitutional limitations, upon the dictates of natural justice and the nature
of the social compact. Later this requirement was found to be one of
the many demanded by "due process of law,"" ° and as such is equally
binding upon the nation and the states. A 1935 Massachusetts de-
cision,0" holding that the state cannot, through mortgage loans, aid in
the construction and repair of private homes, shows that the doctrine is
still alive and flourishing in some courts. Although the liberal tradition
established by recent Supreme Court cases, capped by Green v. Fra-
zier, 202 shows that it is decidely on the wane, the history of "due pro-
cess" demonstrates that such rules can be readily resuscitated. If the
-Court chooses to do so, ample precedents are available to embarass
many of the present undertakings of the national government. The re-
cent Massachusetts case 213 would seem to cast a shadow of doubt upon
the H.O.L.A. Lowell v. Boston 04° even forbade construction loans to
persons whose homes had been destroyed by the Boston fire. Seed loans
have been forbidden. 3 The N.YA. would be interested in a ruling
that public funds cannot be used to support needy university students.: 0
And in 1891 the Supreme Court, in a ruling -"7 sustaining the right of a
198. See supra note 187, for the meaning attached to this term throughout thi paper.
199. 20 Wall. 655 (U. S. 1874).
200. Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112 (1896); Green v. Frazier,
253 U. S. 233 (1920). See McBain, Taxation for a Prh,'ate Purpose (1914) 29 Por. Sci.
QuA. 185; McAllister, Public Purpose in Taxation (1930) 18 CAL'r. L. REv. 137, 241.
201. Opinion of the Justices, 195 N. E. 897 (1935).
202. 253 U. S. 233 (1920). And see Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U. S. 217 (1917)
(sustaining municipal retail fuel yards) and Standard Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln, 275 U. S.
504 (1927) (sustaining a city-owned gasoline station).
203. Opinion of the Justices, 195 N. E. S97 (1935).
204. 111 Mass. 454 (1873).
205. State v. Osawkee Township, 14 Kan. 418 (1875). Contra, State v. Nelson County,
1 N. D. 88 (1890).
206. State v. Snitzler, 143 Mo. 287 (1898).
207. Kaukauna Water Power Co. v. Canal Co., 142 U. S. 254, 272 (1891).
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state government to sell power necessarily produced in the course of
an undertaking to improve navigation, wrote:
"The true distinction seems to be between cases where the dam is
erected for the express or apparent purpose of obtaining a water power
to lease to private individuals, or where in building a dam for a public im-
provement a wholly unnecessary excess of water is created, and cases where
the surplus is a mere incident to the public improvement and a reason-
able provision for securing an adequate supply of water at all times for
such improvement."
The fact that this doctrine has never been applied against Congress is
only mildly persuasive. Neither had the doctrine that legislative powers
cannot be delegated, until the N. I. R. A. cases. If a statement in the
T. V. A. opinion °8 means what it would seem to mean, a majority stands
ready to apply the test of "public purpose."
"The government rightly conceded at the bar, in substance," the Chief
Justice wrote, "that it was without constitutional authority to acquire or
dispose of such energy except as it comes into being in the operation of
works constructed in the exercise of some power delegated to the United
States."
This would seem to be a clear acceptance of the view of 1891. Only the
added conclusion that the case involved the creation of a "wholly un-
necessary excess of water" was necessary to invalidate the project.200
Of course the statement, thus construed, is quite out of keeping with
the generally accepted view that the production and distribution of
electricity is a legitimate function of government. If applied against
the nation under the Fifth Amendment, should it not be applied against
the states under the Fourteenth? 210 One need only vision the conse-
quences, to doubt that this will be done; yet the context in which the
sentence appears seems to demand such a construction. There is a pos-
sibility, however, that the Court had in mind the view that the construc-
tion and operation of a hydro-electric power system, even on such a
gigantic scale as that contemplated in the Tennessee Valley, would be
for a local or regional purpose, and hence, although valid as a govern-
mental 6nterprise, is invalid as a national one.211 If so, it shows how
208. Ashwander v. T. V. A., 56 Sup. Ct. 466, 480 (1936).
209. See the dissenting opinion of McReynolds, J., who insisted that the government
was merely "pretending to act within (its) powers to improve navigation . . .The record
leaves no room for reasonable doubt that the primary purpose was to put the Fhbderal
Government into the business of distributing and selling electric power." Id. at 489. HIs
position would have been stronger had the case involved other than the Wilson dam,
and the issue may have to be faced on its merits in a later suit involving, say, the Nor-
ris Dam project.
210. But see the following paragraph.
211. For a third possible interpretation, see infra.
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this second test may readily be used to supplement the first to accom-
plish "due process" results.
A statement which occurs a few paragraphs earlier in this opinion is
even more interesting. Pointing out that all federal undertakings "must
be consistent with the foundation principles of our dual system of
government," it intimates that probably Congress
"could not establish a steel mill and make and sell steel products, or a
factory to manufacture clothing or shoes for the public, and thus attempt
to make its ownership of energy, generated at its dam, a means of carry-
ing on competitive commercial enterprises and thus drawing to the Fed-
eral Government the conduct and management of business having no re-
lation to the purposes for which the Federal Government was established."
The closing phrase is pregnant with possibilities. Is it to become a
test of "national public purpose"? If so, will it be construed to include,
as one of the "purposes for which the Federal Government was estab-
lished," spending for the "general welfare"? Such a construction
would, of course, render it mere tautology, adding nothing to the nor-
mal "public purpose" doctrine. On the other hand, if it is construed to
include only federal functions it will, if pushed to its logical extreme, give
us the Madison rule so far as "the conduct and management of business"
is concerned. In any case it is further evidence that the doctrine of
"public purpose" is far from obsolete.
General Welfare. Whatever may .be said of the other possible tests,
by the very language of the spending clause an appropriation must be for
the "general welfare." This would seem to imply that there must be
some possibility that the spending will enure to national rather than
merely local advantage. It may have a legitimate public purpose, and
still be so restricted in its effects as to promise, to paraphrase Monroe, 
only local, not general, state, not national, benefit. As such it would
be invalid.
Just how great an area, or how large a proportion of the population,
must be benefited to comply with this test remains a virgin question.
Does it justify a low-cost housing project in Louisville? Or a P. W. A.
project constructing a Greek theatre on a state university campus? A
pick-and-shovel smoothing of a rain-washed hillside on a city street?
Viewed as separate undertakings, all such projects would clearly fail to
meet its requirements. Considered as links in a single nationwide pro-
gram of public works to relieve unemployment they would as dearly
seem to be valid. Other types of undertakings, such as efforts to elim-
inate the wheat rust or the boll weevil, to finance farmers in an area
suffering from drouth, or to aid in the developing of new crops in areas
in which former standard ones are temporarily or permanently out of




the question, are of greatest importance to the afflicted areas, but have
far reaching implications for the entire nation. Their validity would
not seem open to question. The fact that the primary benefits may be
to particular classes rather than to particular areas, as in the case of the
R. F. C., would not seem to alter the question materially.
It has been suggested that the application of this test is a political,
and not a judicial, matter; that its very indefiniteness renders it unfit
as a criterion of judicial decision. Certainly it permits of a check as
sweeping and flexible as that under the "reasonableness" test of due
process, and if applied with as heavy a hand would place a tremendous
burden upon an already overworked bench. Professor Corwin, 213 for
example, poses the difficulties of deciding if the Boston Navy Yard is
for the general welfare. But this view overlooks the probability of the
Court's adopting a companion rule that an appropriation incidental to
a federal function is necessarily, in constitutional contemplation, for the
general welfare, thus narrowing the field of doubt to those which are
for non-federal purposes. Within this realm it seems safe to predict
a r6le for the "general welfare" test quite similar to that of "public
purpose": omnipresent, but normally quiescent.2 14
Government Construction or Operation. It has been suggested that
only federal functions can be carried on by the national government; that
it can subsidize state or private agencies performing non-federal services,
but cannot itself construct, operate, or administer such undertakings.
The contrary view, it is said, "would be wholly inconsistent with the char-
acter of the national government. '2 15
I must confess my inability to present the case for this view, being
utterly unable to see any basis upon which it can be rested. Why does
authority to "provide for the general welfare" include power to advance
that welfare through paying others to perform services, but not through
performing them? Furthermore, this suggestion, like the Madison rule,
proves too much. The departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and
Labor, the bureaus of Census, Fisheries, and Mines, the Geological and
Geodetic Surveys, and the Smithsonian Institute, among others, are
national institutions, and not subsidized state or private agencies. The
Department of Agriculture does its own research; the Bureau of the
Census collects its own materials, and prepares its own reports. The
213. Corwin, The Spending Power of Congress (1923) 36 HAMv. L. R-V. 548, 576,
214. Is such a view foreshadowed by the following statement in the Iloosac Mills
opinion? "When such a contention comes here we naturally require a showing that by no
reasonable possibility can the challenged legislation fall within the wide range of discretion
permitted to the Congress. How great is the extent of that range, when the subject is
the promotion of the general welfare of the United States, we need hardly remark." 56
Sup. Ct. 320 (1936).
215. Note (1935) 48 HARv. L. Rav. 806, 809. And see Clothier, The Federal Water
Power Prograin (1935) 84 U. oF PA. L. R-v. 1, 23.
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adoption of any such rule would seem to be out of the question today.
Nor would this rule seem to find any support in the cases. To be sure,
the quotations given above from the T. V. A. opinion might possibly be
construed as embracing such a view; but can anyone imagine counsel for
the government, with United States v. Certain Lands in Louisvillek0
pending, conceding, even "in substance," the correctness of such a rule?
Would the Court have passed upon it in this off-hand manner, without
argument? It seems far more logical to conclude that it was still con-
tending, as on the previous page, that the undertaking "must be one
adopted in the public interest as distinguished from private or personal
ends."
Governmental Powers and Non-Federal Spending. Perhaps more is
to be said for the qualified form of this rule: When the nation under-
takes to spend for a non-federal purpose, it steps down from its position
as a government and becomes subject to the laws of the states. Such
a view was ardently championed by Monroe,"17 who reasoned:
"The right of appropriation is nothing more than a right to apply the
public's money to this or that purpose. It has no incidental power, nor
does it draw after it any consequence of any kind. All that Congress
could do under it in the case of internal improvements would be to appro-
priate the money necessary to make them. For every act requiring legis-
lative sanction or support the state authority must be relied on. The
condemnation of the land, if the proprietor should refuse to sell it, the
establishment of turnpikes and tolls, and the protection of the work when
finished must be done by the state. To these purposes the powers of the
general government are believed to be utterly incompetent."
Possibly it is a hesitation to face the challenge of this view that
has led the Court to use the "regulation of navigation" as a back door
method of validating such power programs as those of the Colorado and
Tennessee river basins. The effect on such programs is evident, and if
applied to the major portion of the T. V. A. program, as is still possible
under the Astwander decision,"" may be little short of disastrous. The
major Colorado River dams could not have been constructed without
the consent of Arizona, which would have hopelessly deadlocked that
project. The power could not be sold without a certificate of con-
venience and necessity from the state, and the rates to be charged and
the services to be rendered would be subject to state regulation. Espe-
cially in the case of the T. V. A., this might lead to a vicious political
struggle between an agency of the national government and the private
216. 78 F. (2d) 684 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935). CerL granted October 28, 1935; dismisced
March 5, 1936. There is nothing to indicate that at that time there 'was any intention of
abandoning this case.
217. 2 RicA.DsoN, op. cit. supra note 196, at 168.
218. 56 Sup. Ct. 466 (1936).
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power companies for control of key state positions; a struggle in which
the former might well emerge victorious. Surely such a situation is not
to be encouraged in the name of "the rights of the states," for it is a
far more serious threat to them than any power program could possibly
be.
There is the added difficulty that a single project may be in part non-
federal and in part federal. Where a dam is essentially for power pur-
poses but incidentally improves navigation, as in the case of several
T. V. A. dams which have not yet come before the Court, one attempt-
ing to apply the Monroe rule would be faced with a set of facts defying
unscrambling. Where is the line dividing the non-federal from the
federal phases of the project? Some sales should be exempt from state
regulation; which ones? If all are to be held subject to local control,
the national government would be hamstrung in the conduct of its
legitimate functions in defiance of the principle of "national supremacy."
But if the intermingling of a federal purpose, however slight, is taken to
raise the entire project to the level of a federal one, the Monroe rule
could easily be evaded on a grand scale. Perhaps one so easily evaded
is not worth establishing.
If I am correct in assuming that the Court shrinks from such a rule,
it is certain that it will not adopt it if a more satisfactory alternative
is equally defensible. And Professor Corwin 21' has shown that Mon-
roe's doctrine is really nothing more than wishful thinking to bridge
the gap between his state's rights philosophy and his conversion to a
Hamiltonian construction of the spending power. His theory that an
exercise of the power of eminent domain requires the consent of the
state was not contingent upon the spending being for a non-federal pur-
pose; he felt it to be equally necessary if the nation sought land for a
post office. 220 Hence Kohl v. United States221 undermined whatever legal
standing it may have had. Furthermore, to whatever extent United
States v. Gettysburg Electric Ry. Co.,2 2 is to be classed as a "general
welfare" case, it is express authority for the rule that this power carries
with it the power of eminent domain. And if this be true, why does it
not carry with it all other governmental powers as well? It is difficult
to conceive of a nation whose word, when constitutional, is the "supreme
law of the land," being treated as a private party, subject to the whims
of the states.
Spending to Regulate. "The power to tax involves the power to de-
219. Corwin, Constitutional Aspects of Federal Housing (1935) 84 U. or PA. L. Ray.
131, 142-143.
220. 2 RicHARIDsON, op. cit. supra note 196, at 157-161. And see Corwin, cited supra
note 219.
221. 91 U. S. 367, 372-3 (1875).
222. 160 U. S. 668 (1896). See (1936) 45 YAxm L. J. 751.
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stroy." And the power to spend involves the power to control. Just
as there can be no tax which does not have non-revenue consequences, so
there can be no such thing as spending solely for the sake of putting
money into circulation. Perhaps the closest approximation of recent
years to a pure spending spree was the make-work program of the
Partial Workers' Administration. Yet it inevitably was also a means
for the redistribution of wealth, and was intended to be such.
When one turns to the self-liquidating projects he realizes that "the
distinction between the power to legislate on a certain subject and the
power to appropriate for it, is narrow if existent at all." '-3 The aid
given to the construction or expansion of municipal electric systems has
done more to advance the cause of public ownership than many statutes
frankly intended to have such effect. If the T. V. A. is permitted to
carry out its program unmolested, electric rates in the valley will neces-
sarily be driven down and down. The fancy system of bookkeeping
open to the authority224 may enable it to carry this process to an
extreme seriously embarrassing to its privately owned competitors. In
such a case it will be idle to reason that legal authority to regulate the
rates charged by such private companies rests solely in the states. No
doubt these companies will have lost all interest in the law and centered
their attention upon the facts of economics. Nor is government con-
struction and operation of public works necessary to such a conclusion.
Congress, through the device of grants-in-aid to the states,2 has been
legislating on such subjects as highway construction and education for
years. In its grants to foster vocational rehabilitation and maternal and
infant hygiene it entered the broad realm of social legislation, and in
the Social Security226 and the Railroad Retirement22 7 acts of last year
it has invaded the sphere of labor legislation on a grand scale. Even
the control possibilities of the R. F. C. became evident long ago, al-
though at heart it is but a lending agency.
One point is clear. In conjunction with the levying of a tax, the nation
cannot impose regulations which have no necessary connection with the
collection of the funds.228  So in spending money for the advancement
of the general welfare, it cannot impose regulations which have no neces-
sary connection with the general welfare to be thus advanced. If the
sole ground upon which P. W. A. and W. P. A. loans for the construction
of municipal power plants is to be defended is that they are links in
a national scheme of public works to relieve unemployment, the con-
223. Clothier, op. cit. supra note 215.
224. See Note (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 815, 823.
225. See MlAcDoNALD, FFDERAL AiD (1928).
226. 49 STAT. 619, 42 U. S. C. A. § 301 (1935).
227. 49 STAT. 967, 45 U. S. C. A. § 215 (1935).
228. Linde v. United States, 268 U. S. 5 (1925).
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tracts which the government requires... whereby the city binds itself to
follow dertain accounting methods and charge low rates are undoubtedly
void. If the T. V. A. is to be sustained only in terms of navigation and
national defense, it would seem equally difficult to defend the clause in
the act" ° requiring wholesale purchasers of the Corporation's power to
resell at rates fixed by the Authority's directors. But if it is through
the establishment of a number of municipally owned yard-stick plants,
and of a gigantic nationally owned and operated project furnishing
cheap power to a large number of retail consumers, that the "general
welfare" is to be promoted, more is'to be said in defense of these rate
requirements.
Would the Court draw a second parallel between taxation and spend-
ing? An alleged "tax," we have seen, may be invalid because its pur-
pose is not to raise revenue, but to regulate. May an appropriation be
invalid because its real purpose is not to spend, but to control? The
theory of the tax cases is that the act is invalid because the "tax" is
not a tax at all, but a penalty for doing a forbidden act; hence the test
is that of constitutional power to forbid this act outright. May an alleged
"spending" actually be but a series of bribes to secure the performance
of desired acts or the omission of undesired ones, the test of validity
being that of constitutional power to demand or forbid these acts forth-
with?
Such a possibility faced two difficulties. First, the parallel is more
apparent than real. The raising of revenue is the sole constitutional
purpose of the power to tax. Whatever other powers are necessarily
incident to it are purely the consequences of economic fact rather than
of constitutional desire. But spending is not the sole constitutional
purpose of the power to appropriate. In fact, mere spending qua spend-
ing would be unconstitutional per se; it must be spending "to promote
the general welfare." Secondly, the Court, in a statement obviously
intended to be far more than a dictum, had apparently faced this con-
tention and expressly rejected it. In Massachusetts v. Mellon231 coun-
sel for Massachusetts argued that a conditional grant-in-aid "imposed
upon the states an illegal and unconstitutional option either to yield to
the federal government a part of their reserved rights or lose their share
of the moneys appropriated," and had been passed by Congress with
the "ulterior purpose ... to induce the states to yield a portion of their
sovereign rights." But a unanimous court, in an opinion by Mr. Jus-
tice Sutherland, replied:
"Probably, it would be sufficient to point out that the powers of the
state are not invaded, since the statute imposes no obligation but simply
229. See Washington Water Power Co. v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 9 F. Supp. 263, 271
(N. D. Idaho 1934).
230. See supra note 167. 231. 262 U. S. 447, 480, 482 (1923).
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extends an option which the state is free to accept or reject. . . . If Con-
gress enacted it with the ulterior purpose of tempting them to yield, that
purpose may be effectively frustrated by the simple expedient of not
yielding."
Even the fact that non-cooperating states would find their resources
drained by federal taxes to supply the funds necessary to pay the grants
to states which did yield was not sufficient to convince the judges that
an appropriation is none the less an appropriation because it is a bribe.
Yet neither of these hurdles proved stumbling blocks in the Hoosac
Mills case. The majority took each in stride. The spending power, it
seems, is to be limited; and regardless of the elementary principles of
logic, this is to be done in such a way as to preserve a semblance of
the dogma of Kidd v. Pearson,2 32 Hammer v. Dagenltartj-3 and Bailey
v. Drexel Furniture Co.:"4 there is no commerce in production, nor is
there any other normal avenue whereby the national government can
invade this sacred domain of the states.
TEi HoOSAC MILLS CASE 35
The Court unanimously bowed to the inevitable, and rejected the
Madison doctrine. The first clause of Article I, section 8, Mr. justice
Roberts wrote for the majority,
"Confers a power separate and distinct from those later enumerated,
is not restricted in meaning by the grant of them, and Congress subse-
quently has a substantive power to . . . appropriate, limited only by the
requirement that it shall be exercised to provide for the general welfare
of the United States."
The dissenting judges, through Mr. Justice Stone, concurred. "The
spending power of Congress," he wrote, "is in addition to the legislative
power and not subordinate to it." But there was sharp disagreement the
moment that they undertook to apply this rule to the facts before them. =0
There are reasons for believing that the majority considered that
the act violated a basic doctrine of due process. "The sole object of
the legislation," they stated, "is to . . . take money from the processor
and bestow it upon farmers.. . ." Again, it is at heart, "The expropria-
tion of money from one group for the benefit of another." One is im-
232. 128 U. S. 1 (1888). 233. 247 U. S. 251 (1918).
234. 259 U. S. 20 (1922). These cases were discussed in (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 751.
235. United States v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct. 312 (1936). Only so much of the opinion as
concerns the constitutional limits of the spending power will be considered here. Its
bearing upon the question: Who can contest the validity of an appropriation? was di-
cussed in (1936) 45 YAxI. L. J. 772. The taxation aspects of the case were discus_7ed id. at
756.
236. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the disagreement arose becaue
of the refusal of the majority to apply it. See infra.
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mediately reminded of the statement in Loan Association v. Topeka:2"
"There are limitations . . .which grow out of the essential nature of
all free governments. Implied reservations of individual rights, without
which the social compact could not exist, and which are respected by all
governments entitled to the name. No court, for instance, would hesitate
to declare void a statute which enacted . . . that the homestead now
owned by A should no longer be his, but should henceforth be the property
of B."
Change homestead to money and the parallel is complete; and the Topeka
case, it will be recalled, involved bonds and not homesteads. Nor would
it matter if Congress were subsequently to switch the support of the
A. A. A. from processing taxes to the general fund, as this would
merely increase the'number of persons whose property was thus illegally
expropriated for a private, rather than public, purpose.
The difficulty with this argument is that it might not have proved
acceptable to the American public. After all, did not "The First Ameri-
can" commend agriculture to the consideration of Congress, advising
that aid and encouragement be extended to it?"'8  Did not Hamilton
himself, whose views had just been accepted by the Court, state that
"there seems to be no room for doubt that whatever concerns the general
interests of . . . agriculture ...are within the sphere of the national
council, as far as regards an application of money"? 8' Possibly the
majority considered it more politic to rule, not that such encouragement
as the A. A. A. program involved is not a proper function of govern-
ment, but that it is not a proper function of the national government,
thus switching its ruling from a rejection of the claims of agriculture to
a defense of the rights of the states. 40
In explaining why this statute constituted an invasion of the reserved
rights of the states, the majority has given us one of the most interest-
ing studies in legal dialectic to be found in the entire history of this
august tribunal. It starts with the statement that the only limitation
upon the spending power is that the money be appropriated "to provide
for the general welfare of the United States," from which it would seem
237. 20 Wall 655, 663 (U. S. 1874).
238. See President Washington's eighth annual address to Congress, 1 RxcirAxDsou,
op. cit. supra note 196, at 199, 202.
239. 4 WORKS (Lodge ed., 1885-6) 151.
240. The same technique was followed, in an opinion by the same judge, in Railroad
Retirement Board v. Alton Ry. Co., 295 U. S. 330 (1935). Quaere, had that case In-
volved an attempt on the part of a state to force a pension system upon "carriers subject
to the Interstate Commerce Act," would the statute have been struck down as a "burden
upon interstate commerce" which could only be imposed by Congress or with its expresM
[consent?] For an example of the latter technique, see Wabash etc. Ry. Co. v. Illinois,
118 U. S. 557 (1886), qualifying, sub silentlo, The Granger Cases, 94 U. S. 155, 164, 179,
180 (1876) on the road to their ultimate complete reversal in Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S.
466 (1898).
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to follow that the sole question is: Are these appropriations for the gen-
eral welfare? But it never answered that question, at least directly.
It did, however, discuss several others, and it is from these asides that
we must gather what we can to mark out the present law.
The first purported discussion is nothing more than a constant re-
iteration, frequently by way of quotations, of the obvious fact that the
spending power is restricted to the "general welfare," and adds nothing
to the argument."4 This would seem to be preparatory to an attack
upon the question: Does this act appropriate money to advance the
national, or only local, welfare? Instead, the discussion comes to an
abrupt stop with the surprising statement--one of the most surprising
in this or any other opinion-
"We are not now required to ascertain the scope of the phrase 'general
welfare of the United States' or to determine whether an appropriation in
aid of agriculture falls within it. Wholly apart from that question, an-
other principle embedded in our Constitution prohibits the enforcement
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. The act invades the reserved power
of the states. It is a statutory plan to regulate and control agricultural
production, a matter beyond the powers delegated to the federal govern-
ment. . . . Powers not granted are prohibited. None to regulate agri-
cultural production is given, and therefore legislation by Congress for that
purpose is forbidden."
One is reminded of the opinion in the first Child Labor Case:2c
"The Act in a twofold sense is repugnant to the Constitution. It not
only transcends the authority delegated to Congress over commerce but
also exerts a power as to a purely local matter . . . entrusted to local
authority."
Now there is not here two conclusions, but two ways of stating the same
one. To say that a creek is north of an east-west boundary line is tanta-
mount to saying that it is not south; to add, "and furthermore, it is not
south," simply increases the number of words. The reserved powers
of the states are merely those which have not been delegated to the
nation. There would seem to be no other possible definition of them.
Certainly the Tenth Amendment 43 gives none. Consequently, there is
only one way to prove that a power is vested exclusively in the states,
and that is to prove that it has not been delegated to the nation. The
reasoning can never be reversed, for the mere fact that it has been so
delegated is conclusive proof that it is not a reserved power.
In the Child Labor Case the Court apparently realized this. At least
it was careful to point out in detail why, in its opinion, the act exceeded
241. 56 Sup. Ct. 319 (1936).
242. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918).
243. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro-
hibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the pwple"
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the commerce power. It did not say that it need not do this because,
even if within the commerce power, it was beyond the scope of federal
authority because it was an invasion of the exclusive powers of the
states. But now we are told that the spending power "is not limited
by the direct grants of legislative power," and hence, we assume, is not
restricted to interstate commerce or necessarily excluded from the field
of production; that the power to regulate interstate commerce does not
include the power to control agricultural production, which power is
therefore vested exclusively in the states; that it follows that the spend-
ing power cannot be used to control agricultural production. The diffi-
culty is that this is not logic. There is no syllogism. The conclusion
might do violence to the major premise.
One refuses to believe that the majority could have meant what its words
appear to imply. It seems more reasonable to assume that the idea in
back of this paragraph is not that the "reserved rights of the states,"
measured by the normal powers of the federal government, set limits
to the spending power, but that in its opinion there was something about
this statute which deprived it of its status as a true appropriation act
and rendered it a regulatory one, to be tested, therefore, by the "direct
grants of legislative power" to Congress. This assumption appears to
be borne out by the discussion which immediately follows, which pur-
ports to find a parallel between the tax cases 244 and the issue presented
by the spending power.
"If the taxing power," the Court states, "may not be used as the in-
strument to enforce a regulation of matters of state concern with respect
to which the Congress has no authority to interfere, may it, as in the pres-
ent case, be employed to raise the money necessary to purchase a com-
pliance which the Congress is powerless to command? . . .Is a statute
less objectionable which authorizes expenditure of federal moneys to in-
duce action in a field in which the United States has no power to inter-
meddle? The Congress cannot invade state jurisdiction to compel indi-
vidual action; no more can it purchase such action."
This escape from one logical difficulty only brings us face to face with
another. As pointed out above, the alleged parallel of the tax cases is a
fallacious one. If it is true, as it clearly is, that an appropriation is
only valid if it is made "to promote the general welfare," it would seem
244. All of those cited have been discussed in the earlier parts of this paper. See Child
Labor Tax Case, Hill v. Wallace, United States v. Constantine, and Linder v. United States,
all supra notes 49, 53, 55, and 228, respectively. The opinion also quoted Marshall's state-
ment in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 199 (1824): "Congress is not empowered to tax
for those purposes which are within the exclusive province of the states." But as pointed
out in (1936) 45 YArL L. J. 767, this quotation is utterly meaningless when used in con-
nection with the scope of the spending power, and even as a definition of the taxing
power it clearly includes the right to raise revenue to support any nonfederal undertakings
which may be within the scope of the spending power.
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that it is invalid unless it "induces" acts which promote this welfare. To
condemn it for accomplishing what it must accomplish to be valid is
harsh indeed. That is to secure the aims of Madison in the names of
Hamilton and Story. -40
The majority seems to have appreciated this fact, for it hedged on
its definition of "induce." There are four separate portions of the
opinion dealing with this concept. The first concerns coercive action;
the second, mere bribery; the third, contractual agreements to accept
federal regulation in return for a bribe or to escape a "penalty." The
fourth, concerned with "conditional appropriations," is primarily im-
portant because it would seem to question everything that is said relative
to the second if not also to the first.
Replying to the government's contention that "whatever might be
said against the validity of the plan, if compulsory, it is constitutionally
sound because the end is accomplished by voluntary cooperation," Mr.
Justice Roberts wrote:
"The regulation is not in fact voluntary. The farmer, of course, may
refuse to comply, but the price of such refusal is the loss of benefits.
The amount offered is intended to be sufficient to exert pressure on him
to agree to the proposed regulation. The power to confer or withhold un-
limited benefits is the power to coerce or destroy. If the cotton grower
elects not to accept the benefits, he will receive less for his crops; those
who receive payments will be able to undersell him. The result may well
be financial ruin. . . . This is coercion by economic pressure. The as-
serted power of choice is illusory."
Is it not a little strange that this paragraph makes no mention of
Massachusetts v. Mellolt?24  Surely counsel for the Hoosac Mills re-
membered that case well, as its doctrine of "proper parties" to contest
an appropriation has proved so embarrassing to him and to his col-
leagues, one of whom argued it so successfully for the government. It
was there that a unanimous court, it will be recalled, in an opinion
written by one of the present majority, stated: "If Congress enacted
it with the ulterior purpose of tempting them to yield, that purpose
may be effectively frustrated by the simple expedient of not yielding."
The only reference to such a doctrine in the instant case occurs in the
dissent: "Threat of loss, not hope of gain, is the essence of economic
coercion."
The second half of the argument seems especially peculiar and out of
place. How could the withholding of the benefit destroy? Does the
Court mean to imply that in striking down the statute it was acting to
destroy the American farmer? One refusing such a bonus may be
245. This view is presented so adequately in the dissenting opinion that it would be
idle to discuss it further here.
246. 262 U. S. 447 (1923).
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worse off for doing so, but hardly worse off than if it had never been
offered. Obviously the majority was thinking of a different set of
economic facts, having in mind a bonus for growing cotton rather than
one for not growing it. "Those who receive payments will be able to
undersell him." No, they were paid for withdrawing their land from
cultivation, thus withdrawing a part of their normal crop from compe-
tition with his.
"There is nothing to indicate that those who accepted benefits were
impelled by fear of lower prices if they did not accept or that at any stage
in the operation of the plan a farmer could say whether, apart from the
certainty of cash payments dt specified times, the advantage would lie
with curtailment of production plus compensation, rather than with the
same or increased acreage plus the expected rise in prices which actually
occurred."2 47
The detailed discussion of the Frost case,248 which is apparently in-
tended to clinch this argument, is particularly out of point except as it
serves to distinguish the facts of the instant case from a real example
of economic coercion. There the petitioner was required to become a
public carrier or go out of business. He was categorically denied the
right to continue his occupation as a private carrier. The Court cor-
rectly stated that he was "given no choice, except.., between the rock
and the whirlpool-an option to forego a privilege which may be vital
to his livelihood or submit to a requirement which may constitute an
intolerable burden." But the farmer could disregard the A. A. A. and
continue as he had always done. Nor could anything be done to prevent
him from expanding his activities. And in doing so, he was benefited,
!rather than injured, by his competitors, yielding to the seductive charm
of rental and bonus payments.
Having found "coercion" to exist, it was really unnecessary to discuss
what would be done in its absence. Yet the majority did not hesitate
to face the issue squarely.
"But if the plan were one for purely voluntary cooperation," they stated,
"it would stand no better so far as federal power is concerned. At best,
it is a scheme for purchasing with federal funds submission to federal regu-
lation of a subject reserved to the states. . . . Congress has no power
to enforce its commands on the farmer to the ends sought by the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act. It must follow that it may not indirectly ac-
complish those ends by taxing and spending to purchase compliance."
What does this leave of the doctrine of Massachusetts v. Mellon? Is
the theory of that case overruled, or is it to be legal to bribe a state but
illegal to bribe a citizen? If so, we may ultimately end up with a
247. Dissent of Stone, Brandeis, and Cardozo, J. J., 56 Sup. Ct. 326 (1936).
248. Frost and Frost Trucking Co. v. Rr. Commission, 271 U. S. 683 (1926), dis-
cussed at 56 Sup. Ct. 322.
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Hamiltonian rule governing federal grants-in-aid to the states and a close
approximation' of the Madisonian doctrine governing direct relations
between the nation and their citizens. It is difficult to see any juristic
basis for such a distinction, particularly in view of the facts of the two
cases. Massachusetts, if it exercised its rights to refuse to yield, clearly
stood to be injured by the statute. Every time a sister state yielded the
extent of this injury was enhanced. But under the A. A. A. non-co-
operating farmers were not injured, but benefited. Every time a fellow
farmer yielded, the extent of their benefit was enhanced. Yet the rule
might prove to be a workable one, and it is possible that the majority
has taken it under advisement for further consideration.
One would normally assume that by this time the Court had disposed
of the question of the validity of the statute. Instead, it raises a third
objection: ihe money is spent persuant to "contracts which are not
within federal power."
"We are not here concerned," it states, "with a conditional appropria-
tion of money, nor with a provision that if certain conditions are not com-
plied with the appropriation shall no longer be available. . . . The tax
is appropriated to be expended only in payment under contracts whereby
the parties bind themselves to regulation by the federal government. There
is an obvious difference between a statute stating the conditions upon
which moneys shall be expended and one effective only upon assumption of
a contractual obligation to submit to a regulation which otherwise could
not be enforced."
Is this new factor intended as a cumulative objection to the act, or as
an explanation of when the first two are operative? The dissenting
judges, apparently fearing the worse, accept the former view.
"The limitation now sanctioned," they insist, "must lead to absurd
consequences. The government may give seeds to farmers, but may not
condition the gift upon their being planted in places where they are most
needed or even planted at all. The government may give money to the
unemployed, but may not ask that those who get it shall . . .use it to
support their families. . . . It may spend its money for the suppression
of the boll weevil, but may not compensate the farmers for suspending
the growth of cotton in the infected areas. . . . It may support rural
schools, . . . but may not condition its grant by the requirement that
certain standards be maintained.. ..2"
This point is argued so ably and at such length that it may result in
forcing such an interpretation upon the majority opinion, regardless of
what that opinion may have been intended to mean. Mr. Justice Mc-
L~an" did that very sort of thing in Fox v. Ohio20 thereby aiding in
establishing a doctrine which he considered "a mockery of justice, and
a reproach to civilization." 250 The very vehemence of his dissent marked
249. 5 How. 410 (U. S. 1847).
250. Id. at 440. Consult: Grant, The Lanza Rule of Stxcessivc Prosccutions (1932) 32
CoLuam. L. REv. 1309.
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the case as authority on a question which the majority insisted was not
even involved.
In the light of the innocuous nature of these contracts, it would seem
that there is much to be said for this minority interpretation of the rule
of the case. Had they been modeled upon the "license agreements" of
the sugar bounty legislation of 1890251 it would have been quite a differ-
ent story. That act required the producer to post "a bond in a penalty,
and with sureties to be approved by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, conditioned that he will faithfully observe all rules and regu.
lations that shall be prescribed for such manufacture and production
of sugar." But the A. A. A. contracts were merely instrumentalities for
the convenient administration of the act. There were no penalties at-
tached to their breach, save the loss of benefits under them. The
farmers were as free to violate their terms as if they had never signed
them, and lost nothing by doing so that they would not have lost under
a "conditional appropriation." If the mere repeal of the provisions for
such contracts would save the law, Congress has gone to needless effort
in dressing its new production control measure 212 as a "soil conservation
and soil building" act and in seeking new sources of revenue213 to sup-
port it in order to retreat within the rule of Frothingham v. Mellon.'"
Furthermore, if the majority did not mean that these contracts were
merely an additional defect in the statutory set-up, its first two points,
and certainly its second, are deprived of ipost of their practical signifi-
cance. But if the second can stand alone, what is to become of the
fourth point, 55 to the effect that probably a "conditional appropriation
251. 26 STAT. 567, 583 (1890). See the discussion of this statute in (1936) 45 YALE
L. J. 772.
252. P. L. No. 461, 74th Cong. (1936).
253. These are not included in the act, for obvious reasons. See (1936) 45 YAM L. J*.
751. But their necessity is clear evidence of the superficiality of the rule that a taxpayer
does not have a sufficient interest in the spending of money from the general fund to make
him a "proper party" to contest its validity.
254. 262 U. S. 447 (1923).
255. One final matter must be mentioned in connection with these contracts. Counsel
for the government apparently argued that the failure of the states to protest constituted
constructive consent; "that, if any state objects, it may declare the contract void and thug
prevent those under the state's jurisdiction from complying with its terms." The majoylty
replied: "The argument is plainly fallacious. The United States can make the contract
only if the federal power . . . to appropriate teaches the subject-matter of the con-
tract. If this does reach the subject-matter, its exertion cannot be displaced by state
action. To say otherwise is to deny the supremacy of the laws of the United States; to
make them subordinate to those of a state. This would reverse the cardinal principle
embodied in the Constitution and substitute one which declares that Congress may only
effectively legislate as to matters within federal competence when the states do not dis-
sent." This would seem to be a definite rejection of the theory that when spending for
non-federal purposes the nation loses itsstatus as a superior government; and as such It
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of money" may be valid, even though the "conditions" are such that
they could not be imposed as commands? "It is said that no one has
doubted the power of Congress to stipulate the sort of education for
which money shall be expended." Do not such stipulations "induce
action in a field in which the United States has no power to intermeddle"?
Are they not, "at best, . . .a scheme for purchasing with federal funds
submission to federal regulation of a subject reserved to the states?"
By what stretch of the imagination, other than wishful thinking, could
the United States Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry"
assert that under the new "soil conservation" substitute '17 for the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act "The Secretary has no power ...to enforce
compliance by any farmer with any condition prescribed in or pursuant
to" that act, if the mere subsidizing of approved actions constitutes
regulation? In short, with all due respect to the learned justices who
constituted the majority, they have woven a logical web which defies
unweaving. They owe it to the profession and to the American people
to make their meaning more explicit at the very first opportunity.
As a final cap to this sophistic phantasy, the opinion points out the
type of "conditional appropriation which could not be sustained." Thus
"an appropriation to an educational institution which by its terms is
to become available only if the beneficiary enters into a contract to teach
doctrines subversive of the Constitution is clearly bad." Apparently
Mr. Justice Roberts is acquainted with the philosophy of Mr. Justice
Dunbar; for that learned judge used to remark-2 8 that "the fallacy of
a proposition can best be shown by distorting it." Are we to assume
that the states have an exclusive monopoly over the teaching of doc-
trines "subversive of the constitution," and that Congress, by invading
this field, would be violating the Tenth Amendment? The obvious an.
swer, of course, is that such a statute would be unconstitutional regard-
less of which legislature passed it. The example has nothing to do with
the division of powers between nation and states. It has no place in
this opinion.
SUDMMAu£RY AND CONCLUSION
The spending power of Congress is broader than its legislative
powers. But an appropriation is unconstitutional unless it is for a
national public purpose. It is not for such a purpose unless it is for a
"public" one which will advance the "general" welfare. The A. A. A.
would appear sound. Yet on the preceding page, in citing types of contracts which would be
dearly unconstitutional, the opinion lists "contracts calling for violation of a state law."
Let not your left hand know what your right hand doeth 1
256. Smar. REP. No. 1481, 74th Cong. 2d Sess. (1936) 6.
257. P. L. No. 461, 74th Cong. (1936).
258. Jones v. Reed, 3 Wash. 57, 65 (1891).
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opinion makes it clear that both tests are to be applied by the courts,
neither being purely "political." The T. V. A. opinion has strengthened
this conclusion, and apparently has added a third test when the govern-
ment seeks to enter business: it must be one "consistent with the
foundation principles of our dual system of government" and have some
reasonable "relation to the purposes for which the Federal government
was established." In strict logic this third test must be merely a re-
statement of the other two; but from the connection in which it appears
in the opinion, it seems to be a substitute method of attack wherein a
negative answer would make it unnecessary to prove that a given under-
taking is not for the "general welfare." Even so, catchy phrases have a
knack of qualifying the meaning of the provisions from which they
originally spring-witness "liberty of contract," "there is no commerce
in manufacturing," "vested rights." If the T. V. A. phrases attach
themselves to the spending power, they may prove of tremendous im-
portance. Nor can we expect their use to be restricted to "government
in business" cases. Hence we may well ask, is a national system of
retirement pensions in keeping with "the principles of our dual system of
government?" Does financial aid in establishing a system of unem-
ployment insurance have a real relation to "the purposes for which the
federal government was established?" Such a rephrasing of the issues'59
would seem to enhance the probabilities of a judicial check upon the
spending power, as one might honestly believe an act to be inconsistent
with our constitutional system even though it would be beneficial to
the nation.
Can the nation construct, operate, or administer non-federal under-
takings, or can it only subsidize their conduct by others? What evi-
dence we have would seem to dictate the former choice, but neither the
A. A. A. nor T. V. A. opinion adds anything new. If it can carry on in
its own name, does it retain full governmental powers, including its pre-
eminent position under the doctrine of "national supremacy"? The
A. A. A.-opinion would seem to indicate that it does.
The important contribution of the A. A. A. opinion is the "motive"
test: an appropriation may be unconstitutional because the real purpose
is to purchase an acceptance of national regulation in non-federal fields.
Possibly this only applies where a definite "contract" to abide by the
regulations is required. Perhaps it only applies where private persons
are seduced, having no application to grants-in-aid to the states. But
it may be that it applies in any case where the effect is to "induce
action in a field in which the United States has no power to inter-
259. In essence this new test is essentially identical to the "spirit of the Constitution"
yardstick applied in the ill-fated greenback case of Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603
(U. S. 1870). For a vigorous attack upon it as "too abstract and intangible for applica-
tion to courts of justice" see the dissenting opinion in that case, id. at 638.
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meddle." To attempt a more definite statement of this new rule would
be only a false show of erudition and an effort to find certainty where
only uncertainty, as yet, exists.
The dissenting judges have insisted that such a test, whichever form
it may take, coupled with an acceptance of the rule that the spending
power of Congress reaches objects not within the scope of its normal
legislative powers, is so indefinite and self-contradictory as to be "in-
capable of practical application." The point would seem to be well
taken. As they have stated,
"It is a contradiction in terms to say that there is power to spend for the
national welfare, while rejecting any power to impose conditions reason-
ably adapted to the attainment of the end which alone would justify the
expenditure."
When a single fact-in this instance, a "condition"--can be used to
justify or condemn, according to one's fancy, the acme of discretion has
been reached, exceeding even the alternative techniques of the tax cases.
But is this an argument against the test? Possibly it is one in its favor.
"A good judge extends his jurisdiction." Perhaps this ancient maxim
has given way to a new and more significant one: it is the function of
the Court to expand the area of its discretion.
Certainly the history of judicial review substantiates such a conclu-
sion. "Natural justice" gave way to "the spirit of the constitution"
and then to "due process of law" because each in turn proved as flexible
as its predecessor, yet permitted of projection into more and more
fields of legislative endeavor. - 0 The rigid contract cianse of Marshall
gave way to the more flexible one of Taney, and later judges have still
further subdued its ancient intractability. The taxing power was brought
under control, but not without preserving a technique to sustain what-
ever abuses of it are not thought to trespass upon rights meriting judicial
protection. Often this process results in further curtailment of the
powers of our legislatures, but it may also, as in the case of the contract
clause, expand them. The essential common element is that the dis-
cretionary power of the Court is enhanced. Judicial review is now at
its highest point in history. Even the "almost forgotten" privileges
and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been found
to contain untapped sources of power.2 ' Certainly an effort to subdue
the spending power is in keeping with the modern tendency of the Court.
It is likewise fitting that this effort should be first undertaken in a
production case, thus paralleling developments in the field of taxation.
260. Concerning the drawbacks of "natural justice" as a basis of judicial review, me
Grant, The Natural Law Background of Due Process (1931) 31 CoLULrL L. lrv. S6.
261. Colgate v. Harvey, 56 Sup. Ct. 252 (1935), noted in (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 926;
but d. (1936) 45 YA= L. J. 751.
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But in neither instance was the opinion explained in terms of production,
but rather of "the rights of the states." The new taxation rule was
immediately extended to other phases of commerce, and has finally
reached freedom of speech and of the press. Should not similar develop-
ments be looked for relative to spending? The new railroad pension
plan would seem to offer itself for the obvious first step, since it is a
clear attempt to regulate the employer-employee relationship. And then
there is the Social Security Act, with its federally administered pensions
and federally aided unemployment insurance systems, both of which
could be attacked on similar grounds.262
Perhaps the greatest stumbling block in the way of this forward move-
ment is James M. Beck's outstanding success: Frothingham v. Mellon.
Is that decision doomed? If it stands, the decision in the A. A. A. case
may result in nothing more than a shift in the tax burden to support
doubtful non-federal appropriations, from earmarked systems to the
general fund. Injustice, rather than social advantage, may well follow.
Surely the new "soil conservation" measure 63 is a thinly disguised
effort to continue the old A. A. A. program on an enlarged and semi-
permanent scale. If it is the regulation of production, rather than merely
the placing of such a large portion of the burden upon the processor,
that is to be forbidden, the Frothingham rule must go.
That case should be a comparatively easy one to overrule, for it is at
complete variance with the decided weight of authority and the modern
trend as to state as well as municipal expenditures. And of course it
can always be distinguished. The appropriation 2 4 in question in the
Frothingkam case involved less than a million and a quarter dollars per
year. The new "soil conservation" act involves a half a billion, yet it
is exceeded by W. P. A. Although the interest of the taxpayer, if degree
of interest is to be the test, may have been "remote, fluctuating, and
uncertain" in that case, can the same be said as to his interest in the
present acts?
But is there not danger in such a reversal, or even qualification, of that
rule? If we followed the Austrian system of judicial review, under
which the constitutionality of a statute can only be questioned in the
court of last resort, it would be another matter. However, we have
no special procedure for passing upon constitutional issues. Indeed, oir
philosophy of judicial review does not even permit of it, since constitu-
262. Of course statutes contemplating state cooperation may also be nullified by suc-
cessful attacks upon the validity of the state laws. As this is written the New York
Court of Appeals is being asked to hold that the state unemployment insurance act violates
"due process." Chambedlin v. Andrews, and Associated Industries of New York v. De-
partment of Labor of the State of New York, both of which were argued on March 19.
263. P. L. No. 461, 74th Cong. (1936).
264. 42 STAT. 224 (1921).
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tional issues cannot be raised except as incidental to some other ques-
tion of law. The Court may find this fact embarrassing. In short, it is
entirely probable that in undertaking to bring the spending power of
Congress under effective control it has undertaken a bigger task than
it can handle.
